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Abstract
This study explores the positions of economic experts from Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) Member States in the euro reform debate. Given the dominant 
voices from French and German politicians and academics in the European dis-
course, there is an obvious neglect for the positions of CEE countries. Our study 
tries to fill this gap with a large survey among economic expert communities in all 
CEE countries conducted in spring 2019. We compare euro reform preferences to 
benchmarks of surveyed experts in France, Germany, and Italy. We discuss implica-
tions for the ongoing euro area reform with a particular focus on several non-euro 
members’ growing reluctance to introduce the common currency. We argue that 
only a balanced reform package that combines solidarity with debt self-responsibil-
ity could foster the euro’s appeal in the CEE region.
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1 Introduction
A variety of reforms has been implemented to improve the institutional set-up of 
the euro area over the last decade.1 Nevertheless, the political and academic reform 
debate remains intense and the future of the euro area is unclear. There is a large 
consensus that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is still a “half-built 
house” (Bergsten 2012). Much less consensus exists on the priorities for the direc-
tion of additional reforms. Ideas for the next steps are diverse; they comprise vari-
ous suggestions for new stabilization tools that shield EMU members against asym-
metric shocks, more refined and credible fiscal rules, suggestions for new sovereign 
financing tools, and blueprints for sovereign insolvency procedures (Dolls et  al. 
2016).
One striking feature of the ongoing debate is that it is characterized prominently 
by contributions from larger euro countries from Western Europe. Both politicians 
and economists of countries like France and Germany are highly active and influ-
ential in this debate. For example, the so-called “7 + 7 report” by seven French and 
seven German economists (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018) was an important and influ-
ential academic initiative to impact the EMU reform debate. On the political level, 
the joint “Meseberg Declaration” of the French and German governments with its 
section on EMU reforms from June 2018 is an example how large Member States 
in the West formulate joint positions that tend to set the agenda for further reform 
negotiations (Press and Information Office 2018). By contrast, smaller EU Member 
States and even more Member States from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) seem 
to be much less visible and influential.
Given this Western European dominance, we want to elicit the preferences of 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States in the debate on the reform of 
the euro area. We base our analysis on a unique database. We are able to assess the 
EMU reform preferences of CEE economic experts compared to France, Germany, 
and Italy based on a large and comprehensive survey of more than 1800 economists 
that was in the field in spring 2019. With this database, we are the first to map expert 
communities in all CEE EU Member States relative to their colleagues in the three 
reference countries. This comparison covers a range of important EMU reform 
topics.
Expert opinions are a relevant source of information to identify a country’s 
reform preferences. Experts often come from the same academic elites as a coun-
try’s politicians. They serve as advisors to national decision makers and thus 
1 Fiscal and macroeconomic governance rules have been refined and the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) have been strengthened. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has been estab-
lished as a source of liquidity for countries that lose capital market access and are ready to accept its con-
ditions. On top of that, the European Central Bank (ECB) has effectively stepped into the role of a lender 
of last resort through the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program. So far, OMT has never been 
activated but its mere existence has contributed to restoring trust in the markets for sovereign euro bonds. 
A banking union has been set up with a European supervision of large banks under the responsibility of 
the ECB and the establishment of a European Banking Resolution Mechanism. For more detailed infor-
mation on reform efforts see Lane (2012) and Copelovitch et al. (2016).
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shape a government’s position to some extent. More directly, economists can pre-
pare or even take policy decisions themselves if they hold relevant positions like 
at central banks, fiscal councils or if they serve in ministries or turn to politics 
themselves (Hirschman and Popp Berman 2014). However, causality can run into 
both directions. Experts could have an impact on their own country’s position. 
Or, alternatively, experts may simply take up the dominant views in their country 
as they are exposed to the same national media and national interests as ordinary 
citizens. Hence, their economic policy preferences might also mirror their coun-
tries’ interests and public discourse to some extent.
Macroeconomic and European integration research has started to pay atten-
tion to the national heterogeneity of economists’ positions in a few studies. De 
Ville and Berckvens (2015) conduct a survey on EMU reforms among euro area 
academic experts. They claim to identify an outsider-role of German economists, 
who are skeptical of any proposal moving the EMU in the direction of a fiscal 
union built on more fiscal stabilization mechanisms and mutual fiscal guarantees. 
However, the survey’s sample size is limited (about 250 responses) with only a 
few responses from CEE countries, mainly from Slovenia. Moreover, the survey 
disregards crucial euro reform dimensions like a sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism. Potrafke and Reischmann (2016) link economists’ survey responses 
on a possible Greek exit from the euro to their countries’ characteristics. They 
find that experts from countries with lower creditworthiness are more opposed to 
Greece leaving the euro than experts from countries with sound public finances. 
Asatryan et al. (2019) test for a national imprint in the estimation an important 
fiscal policy input—the fiscal multiplier. They show that the researcher’s national 
background, proxied by her country’s government-spending-to-GDP ratio is posi-
tively related to her estimate of the fiscal multiplier.
While empirical studies for experts are still rare, there exists more evidence 
on the positions of EU governments and politicians on EU and EMU reform. 
The “EMU Positions” dataset from Wasserfallen et  al. (2019) describes Mem-
ber States’ positions in recent euro reform negotiations. Lehner and Wasserfallen 
(2019) find that these negotiations have been dominated by a one-dimensional 
conflict between Southern countries advocating more fiscal transfers and North-
ern countries prioritizing fiscal discipline. CEE countries have heterogeneous 
positions but often align with the Northern coalition stressing fiscal discipline. 
Insights on EU and EMU preferences for Germany, France, and Italy are provided 
by Blesse et al. (2019), who conduct a survey among the members of the three 
countries’ national parliaments. Their results point to a rather isolated position for 
Germany, as they find a larger consensus between Italian and French politicians, 
while Germans more often disagree with their French and Italian colleagues.
Against the only gradually emerging empirical literature on EU expert reform 
preferences, our contribution can be summarized along three dimensions. First, 
we provide insights on EMU reform preferences of national expert communities 
in CEE countries on the basis of the largest euro-related expert survey that exists 
so far. This first contribution is of a descriptive nature and is valuable information 
as such, which allows to map the diverse positions of CEE countries across the 
reform space.
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Second and more analytically, we look at the emerging profile of expert prefer-
ences in the light of country characteristics to uncover a possible link between expert 
positions and their country’s interests. Pisany-Ferry (2018) explains diverging eco-
nomic positions between the European North and South as driven by both a “battle 
of interests” and a “battle of ideas”. According to the “battle of interests” view, posi-
tions differ because they reflect different national self-interests. For example, a high-
debt euro country will support mutual guarantees and a low-debt country will be 
rather opposed. According to the “battle of ideas” view, national positions are rather 
influenced by different economic school of thoughts with the prominent example 
of the French interventionism versus the German “Ordo-Liberalism” (Brunnermeier 
et al. 2016).
Third, we are able to draw conclusions for euro area reform strategies that 
would be able to make Europe’s currency more appealing for CEE non-euro coun-
tries given the evidence that the appeal of Europe’s common currency has strongly 
declined over the last decade in non-euro CEE countries (Roth et al. 2019).
For the first contribution, the mapping of preferences, key results are as follows: 
CEE economists outside the euro area are less enthusiastic about the benefits of the 
euro than experts from euro countries. CEE countries are significantly less support-
ive than France and Italy on more EU competencies in taxation. On reforms that 
entail more redistribution, expert preferences differ between richer and poorer coun-
tries. CEE expert communities are receptive towards new stabilization tools like 
a European unemployment insurance scheme. On Eurobonds, experts from CEE 
countries are often undecided, only poorer non-euro countries (Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Croatia) show a clear support, albeit not at the Italian level. Survey participants 
from the CEE countries often line up with German experts in their resistance to a 
relaxation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). On the debate about sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanisms, the divide is clearly between Germany and CEE on 
the one hand (very supportive), and France and Italy on the other hand (only mildly 
supportive). Finally, eastern economists back both the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS) and the ECB’s asset purchases.
On the second contribution, the link between positions and national interests, we 
argue that a substantial part of the described heterogeneity is consistent with country 
interests. Economists from poorer CEE countries are more in favor of cross-coun-
try redistribution and Eurobonds than those from more advanced economies. The 
resistance against a weakening of the SGP is particularly large in the richer CEE 
countries. Likewise, CEE positions on European tax competencies (rejection) and a 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (support) correspond to country character-
istics, i.e., the low effective corporate tax rates and the low public debt level (com-
pared to countries like Italy and France). Thus, we find ample evidence for the “bat-
tle of interest” view also in the cross-country heterogeneity of CEE expert views.
Relating to the third contribution that relates to EMU reform implications, one 
insight is that a further euro enlargement will depend on the new shape of euro 
institutions. A balanced reform that reconciles effective macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion with credible no-bailout institutions could make euro accession of EU Member 
States like Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic more likely. Conversely, given 
these countries’ stable convergence path and more favorable fiscal development, it 
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is unlikely that they could join a single currency that entails far reaching fiscal and 
monetary guarantees also for Member States with a debt overhang. This conclu-
sion is particularly supported by the broad CEE expert support for a sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism for the euro area.
In Sect. 2, we comprehensively screen the fiscal and economic situation of CEE 
countries to assess these countries’ specific needs and preferences for the further 
evolution of euro area institutions. Section 3 describes our survey and Sect. 4 pre-
sents its results. Section 5 concludes and discusses avenues for comprehensive euro 
area reform that could pave the way into the euro for most CEE countries.
2  Interests and incentives of CEE countries for euro area reforms
In this section, we briefly assess the current state and developments in CEE coun-
tries for the following aspects: euro area membership—state and prospect, the eco-
nomic convergence process, the cyclical volatility and labor market situation, the 
fiscal situation, as well as the corporate tax competitiveness. These country features 
will provide a benchmark when assessing the consistency of expert EMU prefer-
ences with their home countries’ interests.
2.1  Euro area membership: state and prospect
The Baltic countries, Slovenia, and Slovakia have introduced the euro while the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania have not yet 
acceded to the common currency and, in the legal terminology, are “Member States 
with a derogation” (Art. 139 TFEU). Slovenia and Slovakia joined the euro area first 
in 2007 and 2009 respectively, while the Baltic countries followed afterwards with 
Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), and Lithuania (2015). In all CEE euro members, pub-
lic support for the euro is significant and has grown since accession to the monetary 
union (Roth et al. 2016).
Although the introduction of the euro is an ultimate goal of EU membership and 
EU Member States with a derogation are obliged to join once they meet the conver-
gence criteria, most eastern non-euro countries are currently not considering to join 
the EMU with the exception of Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria (see Table 1). The 
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Romania still have free- or managed floating 
exchange rates. Reasons for not entering the euro area are quite heterogeneous, rang-
ing from domestic reasons, like insufficient economic convergence over a lacking 
perceived attractiveness of euro membership, to an unresolved institutional reform 
agenda (Backé and Dvorsky 2018).
Bulgaria and Croatia intend to enter the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM II) in the foreseeable future, which would put the exchange rates of their 
national currencies in a narrowly defined bandwidth to the euro and would fur-
ther their integration to the euro area. Bulgaria already pegs its national cur-
rency to the euro and thus has already fully given up an independent monetary 
policy. Meanwhile, Romania has prepared a draft plan to adopt the ERM II, 
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which has not officially been confirmed yet, though the country hopes to adopt 
the euro in 2024 (Euractiv 2019). Croatia has officially applied for membership 
in ERM II in July 2019 (European Council 2019).
2.2  Convergence process and net‑beneficiary status in the European Union
Regardless of euro adoption, all Eastern Member States underwent significant 
economic growth from the early 1990s to this day. In studies analyzing time 
periods before 2010, the catch-up process of CEE countries is not visible (see, 
e.g., Borsi and Metiu 2015). Studies using more recent data confirm the conver-
gence process of CEE countries (see, e.g., Diaz del Hoyo et al. 2017). However, 
real income convergence is diverse across CEE countries, with a GDP per capita 
(in purchasing power parities) ranging from 49.3 to 89.4% of the EU28 average 
in Bulgaria and Czech Republic in 2017, respectively (Table 2). Similarly, Borsi 
and Metiu (2015) and Von Lyncker and Thoennessen (2017) find heterogeneous 
real income convergence of CEE countries.
The catch-up process has already progressed significantly for some CEE 
countries, such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slova-
kia who have income levels of more than 75% of the EU average. For instance, 
in 2017, the Czech Republic (89%) and Slovenia (85%) have already surpassed 
the income levels of several Southern EU members, such as Greece and Portugal 
with 67 and 77% of the EU28 average, respectively (Eurostat 2019a). Hence, 
these CEE countries are closely behind Spain (92%) and Italy (96% of EU28 
average) in terms of income levels. However, other CEE countries are still lag-
ging further behind with income levels around two thirds of the EU28 average or 
less. Convergence seems to continue as recent favorable growth projections for 
the years 2019 and 2020 indicate (European Commission 2019).
For EMU reform positioning, these findings would suggest that an increas-
ing number of CEE countries should not have a strong interest in an extensive 
new euro area transfer system, as they may become donor countries in any such 
system in the not too distant future. However, the support for the existing instru-
ments in the EU budget should remain strong for a long time to come. So far, all 
CEE countries are still strong beneficiaries from EU funding as is clear from the 
net balances with the EU budget as a share of gross national income (Table 2).
Payments in cohesion policy adjust to increasing income only very slowly and 
with considerable lag. Therefore, the current net balance profile in the classi-
cal transfer instruments of Cohesion and Common Agricultural Policy will still 
characterize EU spending at least for the time period of the coming Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2021–2027. This should explain a strong interest of CEE 
countries to preserve these traditional European transfer instruments as they are 
and not compromise them for new euro area fiscal capacities with their unpre-
dictable beneficiary profile.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Empirica (2021) 48:155–179 
2.3  Cyclical volatility and labor market situation
Table 2 also shows indicators for GDP volatility over the crisis decade (2007–2017), 
i.e., the standard deviation as well as the minimum and maximum of real annual 
GDP growth. These numbers indicate that the decade of (average) economic conver-
gence has also been characterized by a higher GDP volatility for most Eastern Euro-
pean countries compared to Western Europe. Only Poland had a stable GDP growth 
rates similar to the one of Germany, Italy or France.2
While the 2009 recession was deep in CEE countries, with particularly severe 
contractions of about 14–15% of real GDP in the Baltic countries, economic growth 
recovered immediately after in 2010, and thus much faster than the rest of the euro 
area. After that, the region returned to a sustained growth path (Eurostat 2019a). 
Only Slovenia went through a longer transition path to growth with a second reces-
sion in 2012/2013 (Backé and Dvorsky 2018). It is worth mentioning that the Baltics 
achieved fast recovery while they were still outside the euro area but they stuck to 
their currencies’ euro peg. Thus, these economies recovered without devaluing their 
currencies. Instead, strong frontloaded fiscal adjustments led to a massive internal 
devaluation (for the Latvian case, see Blanchard 2012).
Table 2 compares labor market flexibility of CEEs to the old Member States like 
Germany, Italy, and France by measuring flexibility with the Employment Protec-
tion Legislation (EPL) indicator of the OECD. It comprises weighted averages of 
detailed measures on labor regulation on permanent and temporary work. The final 
measure varies from 0 to 6, where a low value indicates flexible EPL. The EPL 
measure suggests that most CEE countries have lower labor regulation than Italy 
and France but are comparable to Germany, which substantially deregulated its 
labor markets before the financial crisis. For instance, CEEs often have maximum 
unemployment benefit durations of about a year with relatively low benefit generos-
ity levels compared to other European countries (OECD 2013).
In general, unemployment rates in CEE countries have reached levels below those 
of low-growth Western European countries like Italy of France. However, in some 
Eastern European economies, unemployment rates have not yet returned to the lower 
pre-crisis levels (Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, and Bulgaria). Het-
erogeneity among CEEs is large, with unemployment rates ranging from 2.9 to 11% 
in the Czech Republic and Croatia, respectively.
The evidence on growth volatility and insufficient employment growth accompa-
nying the growth resurgence after the financial crisis illustrates that CEE economies 
might benefit from more effective stabilization tools for the EU and the euro area 
against asymmetric economic shocks.
2 In fact, Poland was the only country that did not experience a recession during the financial crisis.
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2.4  Fiscal situation
Compared to Western Europe, CEE countries have a more favorable fiscal situ-
ation. Debt-to-GDP ratios are currently on average 42.6 and 49.5% for euro and 
non-euro CEE countries, respectively. This is well below other euro members 
and the EU28 as a whole (see Table 3). Only Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia are 
somewhat above the 60% threshold imposed by the Maastricht criteria.
Also debt dynamics are more favorable in general, as current deficits are low 
compared to the EU28 average (Table  3), and the combination of low deficits 
with a low interest burden and high growth rates leads to a significant fall in debt-
to-GDP ratios. Five CEE countries run budget surpluses, while only Hungary, 
Romania, and Poland had deficits above the EU28 average in 2017.
At the moment, no CEE country violates the Maastricht 3% deficit criterion 
(see Table 3). Indeed, most CEE countries rarely breach the 3% threshold, with 
most violations during the financial crisis given the particularly severe recessions 
in the region. Poland and Hungary are the exceptions, with a large number of 
violations of the deficit rule from 2005 to 2017, i.e. 9 and 7 violations, respec-
tively. Croatia only recently was able to bring its deficits below the respective 
Maastricht threshold. Estonia, in contrast, never violated the deficit rule. Moreo-
ver, CEE economies are characterized by rather low shares of total government 
spending to GDP (only Hungary is above the EU28 average in 2017; see Eurostat 
2019c).
This overall favorable fiscal situation explains why several CEE countries, just 
like other Northern EU members, have no interest in a relaxation of fiscal rules, 
and are rather skeptical on new institutions that could be abused for bailing out 
high-debt euro members.
2.5  Corporate tax competitiveness
CEE countries, both inside and outside of the euro, have substantially lower 
effective average tax rates in corporate taxation than the EU as a whole. Given 
their highly competitive corporate tax policies, these countries should have a nat-
ural interest in keeping their national fiscal autonomy and position themselves 
against new EU competencies in tax harmonization. Possibly, CEE countries may 
be more open to policies that combat tax base erosion due to profit shifting in the 
European Union, such as the Common (Consolidated) Corporate tax base pro-
posal from the European Commission (CCCTB or CCTB). The C(C)CTB would 
harmonize the corporate tax base across Member States but preserve national 
autonomy regarding tax rates.
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3  The expert survey: structure, execution, and response rates
In the following, we shed more light on EMU reform preferences of CEE coun-
tries by presenting the results of our self-conducted expert survey. Box 1 summa-
rizes the survey structure (see “Appendix” for full questions).
We first ask how much the respondents support the euro. For euro member coun-
tries, we ask whether the euro is beneficial for the country’s economy. In contrast, 
for non-euro countries, we ask whether the introduction of the common currency 
would be economically beneficial.
The second block of questions concerns preferences on tax centralization and 
increased redistribution among EU Member States. Increased transfers from rich to 
poor members could ultimately lead to a federal union with fiscal equalization in 
the EU. To some extent, such a mechanism is already in place through the cohesion 
policy financed from the European budget.3
The third block comprises of several questions on key EMU reform topics. First, 
we ask experts on their support for a potential European unemployment insurance 
scheme. This concept is prominently discussed as a way to cope with asymmetric 
economic shocks to euro area members. If countries give up an adjustable exchange 
rate, other adjustment instruments like fiscal insurance schemes could provide com-
pensation for the affected countries.
Second, we ask questions on the desirability of Eurobonds and the asset purchase 
program by the ECB. These questions give an idea about the respondents’ prefer-
ences with respect to how the euro area should cope with liquidity crises. Panic-
driven vicious cycles on government bond markets, as in the recent euro area debt 
crisis, threaten to push countries into illiquidity even if these countries are not 
Box 1  Questionnaire structure 
of expert survey
Note: Own depiction
General attitudes on euro and economic policy





Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
European unemployment insurance
Eurobonds
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
Insolvency procedure for euro Member States
Asset purchase programme of ECB
Completion of Banking Union
3 Conceptually, it is crucial to distinguish between stabilization/insurance against asymmetric shocks 
(without a permanent transfer element) and permanent equalizing transfer payments.
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insolvent. Various contagion risks and destructive loops such as increasing risk 
premia, financial instabilities, a downturn of the real economy or deteriorating pub-
lic finances can have devastating consequences. In 2012, the ECB stepped in as a 
potential lender of last resort through the establishment of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program. Thus, it backed up the liquidity support provided by 
the ESM. We ask experts about their attitudes on the asset purchase program of the 
ECB. We also ask economic experts on their opinion regarding Eurobonds which 
are, by contrast, a very different solution for liquidity crises than asset purchases 
of the ECB. Specifically, Eurobonds provide liquidity through a common Euro-
pean bond that finances public debt of all Member States based on extensive mutual 
guarantees.
Third, we ask our participants about their attitudes regarding a potential relaxa-
tion of the SGP. The Maastricht criteria and the SGP in particular intended to incen-
tivize fiscal sustainability of EU Member States.
Fourth, we ask whether there should be an explicit sovereign insolvency proce-
dure for euro Member States with unsustainable debt. Debt is unsustainable in cases 
of outright insolvency, i.e., if there is a public debt overhang in excess of the tax-
ing and repayment capacity of a country which is also beyond a temporary liquid-
ity crisis. If the debt overhang is not (sufficiently) addressed through transfers from 
European institutions or other Member States, public debt has to be restructured. A 
sovereign insolvency procedure can provide mechanisms and rules to manage the 
restructuring in an orderly way (Fuest et al. 2016; Destais et al. 2019).4 Hence, the 
EMU’s way to deal with insolvency implies a decision on the intensity of market 
discipline.
Finally, we survey the experts on their preferences regarding the completion 
of the Banking Union through the establishment of the EDIS. While EDIS may 
increase the resilience of the Banking Union with respect to destructive panics of 
depositors (Béranger and Laurence 2015), opponents are afraid of a collectivization 
of non-performing loans or excessive sovereign exposure in national banking sys-
tems of the EU.
We fielded our expert survey on economists across EU Member States in Febru-
ary 2019 and received answers from February to April 2019. The survey was con-
ducted as an online survey with two email reminders for participants who did not 
answer and did not explicitly decline participation. The survey was translated in the 
respective mother tongues for German, French, and Italian participants, though the 
email also included a second version of the invitation in English. Invitation emails 
and the web-survey for all CEE countries were in English.
Our sample consists of a comprehensive list of economists in the three largest 
“old” EU Member States (Germany, France, and Italy), as well as all “new” Member 
States from CEE countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Croatia, Bulgaria, 
4 Also the (non-)existence of a credible debt restructuring option has incentive effects for borrowers and 
creditors. A credible insolvency procedure for sovereigns will make creditors more cautious in providing 
capital to countries with a critical debt level. Thus, issuing new debt becomes more expensive for debt-
ors.
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Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). Although we are 
mainly interested in the variation of attitudes on EU and euro area reforms from new 
Member States, we include German, French, and Italian expert views as the bench-
mark against which (heterogeneous) views from CEE countries can be evaluated.
For CEE countries, we retrieved the relevant participant list by searching for mem-
bers of all economics departments, institutes, and research centers (EDIRC) in the 
respective countries, which are listed on Repec.org (Research Papers in Economics) 
as of July 2018. EDIRC indexes economic institutions with links to their members 
and publications listed on RePEc. Since our RePEc search was for institutions and we 
subsequently obtained author data from the institution websites, not all survey partic-
ipants from new Member States are necessarily listed on RePEc and are not necessar-
ily economists (but only work for an economics institution) in that respective country.
Since Germany, France, and Italy have arguably much higher numbers of aca-
demic and non-academic economists, we sampled only the top 25% of RePEc 
authors listed at institutions residing in these countries.5 Altogether, we surveyed 
7332 economists from 14 EU countries. The number of responses and response rates 
for each country can be found in Table 4. We received answers from more than 1800 
experts, which amounts to an overall response rate of about 25%. Individual partici-
pation rates per country range from 19% in France to 38% in Italy. All CEE coun-
tries have sound response rates from 21 to 31% of all interviewees (see Table 4 for 
details).
4  Survey results
Table  5 reports means and standard deviations (SD) for all survey questions and 
countries. Points refer to the answer scale of − 4 to + 4, where a higher score means 
a larger agreement with the question’s position (for precise question formulation, see 
“Appendix”). While the mean indicates the average position of a country’s expert 
community, the SD is informative as to the consensus within the national commu-
nity (with a low/high SD indicating a high/low consensus).
4.1  General attitudes on euro and economic policy
First, we asked survey participants in euro area countries whether they perceive euro 
membership as economically beneficial. We find that none of the national expert 
communities of the euro area seem to regret that their country has entered the com-
mon currency. This holds both for older members like Germany, Italy, and France, 
as well as the new entrants from the CEE region (Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slo-
vakia, and Latvia), which all voice strong average support for euro membership.
In a similar vein, we asked economists from non-euro countries whether they 
think that the introduction of the euro would be economically beneficial. Economists 
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from non-euro CEE countries (especially Czech Republic and Croatia) are some-
what less enthusiastic about introducing the euro in their countries. However, aver-
age answers are positive and economists are generally supportive of a possible euro 
currency introduction in their respective home countries. Thus, economic experts in 
non-euro countries are clearly more in favor of a euro introduction than the popula-
tion in general: Eurobarometer data reveal a declining support for the euro in the 
non-euro countries over the past decade with net support levels having turned nega-
tive for several countries (Roth et al. 2019).
4.2  Tax centralization and redistribution
Do economic experts want to delegate more competences from the national to the 
European level? Regarding more EU competencies in taxation (through qualified 
majority instead of unanimity), CEE countries are significantly less supportive than 
France and Italy. Most CEE countries line up well with the German position and 
are only weakly supportive of facilitated EU-legislation on union-wide tax issues. 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria are undecided, while Estonia slightly 
rejects the proposal. Overall, this corresponds to the prediction that the low-tax CEE 
countries should be more cautious in handing over tax competencies to Brussels.
Moreover, expert communities in poorer countries are more supportive for 
an increase of redistributive transfers from rich to poor countries in the EU. The 
support is relatively high (average scores around 1.5 or more) in Italy, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Romania, and Croatia. Economists in Germany and, even more so, in the 
Czech Republic, are rather skeptical. Other CEE countries provide only mild sup-
port for progressive transfers across EU Members. The fact that CEE experts are by 
no means more supportive for redistribution than in a country like Italy corresponds 
to a forward-looking perspective on relative income levels in the EU. If the currently 
stable growth of income levels in CEE countries continues, they may soon overtake 
several western non-converging EU countries and would then cease to be beneficiar-
ies of more intense redistribution.
4.3  European Monetary Union
Our first EMU-related question asked for the perceived need of fiscal stabiliza-
tion against asymmetric shocks and mentions the example of a European unem-
ployment insurance scheme. Both French and Italian economists strongly support 
more fiscal stabilization of this kind, while participants from Germany are only 
slightly supportive. Experts in Estonia and the Czech Republic align well with 
the almost undecided German view, while all other countries support risk sharing 
through a common unemployment insurance scheme in the euro area. CEE sup-
port is somewhat weaker, however, than in France and Italy, with the exception of 
Romania, Slovenia, and Latvia. The friendly perspective on institutional reforms 
like a European unemployment insurance scheme corresponds to CEE members’ 
national interests given their recent history with respect to volatility of economic 
growth and unemployment rates over the last decade.
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Second, we surveyed the views on debt mutualization in the EMU with a ques-
tion on Eurobonds. Eurobonds can provide liquidity for euro countries that lose 
market access. At the same time, they can imply a transfer from countries with 
high to countries with low creditworthiness. As expected, we observe that Ger-
man economists reject the proposal, while there is clear support for Eurobonds 
among the French and even more so among Italian experts. Expert communities 
in most eastern Member States, however, show less support than participants 
from France and Italy. Only the poorer non-euro countries in the region (Latvia, 
Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria) reach average scores of about one or above. 
Interestingly, Estonians line up with German economists and reject debt mutual-
ization through the introduction of Eurobonds. The lack of Eurobond enthusiasm 
in the east is consistent with the more sound public finances of CEE countries 
and a perception that these countries are unlikely to need to safeguard their budg-
ets through mutual financial guarantees with other Member States.
Third, we asked experts about their views on the SGP and their support for 
relaxation of the SGP. German economists reject a softer SGP while experts from 
France and Italy are essentially undecided on the matter. Economists in most CEE 
countries appear to be often well in line with the German expert position. Only 
Latvia, Romania, and Croatia have positive means (i.e., supportive of a relax-
ation) while Slovenia is negative but close to zero. As argued above, the high 
compliance of CEE countries with the SGP in the recent past could explain this 
observation.
Fourth, we investigated preferences on an insolvency procedure for euro Member 
States with unsustainable debt. Participants from all countries (including all euro 
and non-euro CEE countries) support such an explicit sovereign debt procedure, 
with German, Slovakian, and Bulgarian economists showing the strongest support 
on average. Remarkably, French and Italian economists are also somewhat support-
ive of an explicit mechanism for debt restructuring, but with lower average scores 
than Germany and all CEE countries. Thus, on that issue, the divide, if any, is rather 
between Germany and CEE countries on the one side, and France and Italy on the 
other side. This finding is also consistent with a “battle of interest” view in that CEE 
countries have a more sustainable public debt situation and, therefore, are less con-
cerned about the possible risks of a sovereign insolvency.
Fifth, we surveyed which stance economists take on the asset purchase program 
of the ECB. The results suggest that experts from most countries are supportive 
of the active role of the ECB and want it to continue. Support is especially strong 
among experts in France, Italy, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Croatia. 
Support is the weakest in Germany, where the average response is even slightly neg-
ative, and other countries such as Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary 
which are undecided.
Finally, participants had to answer whether they support the completion of the 
European Banking Union through EDIS. Interestingly, this policy reaches unani-
mous support across expert communities in all countries. Although CEE countries 
are supportive, the enthusiasm for EDIS does not reach the Italian level in any other 
country. The most supportive CEE countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Croatia, 
and Bulgaria) line up well with the average support level of French experts.
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5  Euro reform conclusions
The results of our expert survey in CEE countries suggest that economists’ support 
for euro area reforms corresponds to their countries’ interests given the economic 
and fiscal situation of the respective country. The acceptance of the euro among eco-
nomic experts is generally higher in euro Member States than in non-euro Member 
States. This corroborates with findings of Roth et al. (2016 and 2019) where euro 
support among residents of euro countries was increasing since the financial crisis 
while it decreased strongly for non-euro countries including CEE countries. Recent 
Eurobarometer polls indicate that among the CEE Member States only Romania has 
popular support for a euro adoption while all other countries lost popular support 
(European Commission 2018).
Experts in CEE countries are in general more cautious with respect to more EU 
centralization and coordination. Economic experts in CEE countries are much less 
supportive of a larger EU role in corporate taxation than their western colleagues—a 
finding clearly consistent with national interests given low tax rates in CEE coun-
tries. Preferences regarding redistributive transfers across Member States does not 
follow East–West divisions but is well in line with the income levels of the respec-
tive country. Specifically, poorer countries show higher support of more redistribu-
tive transfers in the EU.
For EMU-related innovations that could provide more stabilization (European 
unemployment insurance) or increase trust in national banking systems (EDIS), 
positions of most CEE countries are friendly but often not that as supportive as the 
Italian benchmark. This might mirror the demand for macroeconomic insurance 
given past large GDP fluctuations but at the same time concerns on the risks of 
future unfavorable transfer patterns within the euro area.
An insolvency procedure for sovereigns in the euro area is welcomed in all 
CEE countries. This finding is consistent with a perception that EMU membership 
increasingly entails a participation in guarantee and transfer schemes that support or 
might eventually even bail out high-debt countries. From the perspective of rather 
fiscally sound countries with a good growth performance (outside the euro), this 
perception makes euro membership less attractive. This interpretation is consistent 
with our evidence that experts particularly from more advanced non-euro countries 
are less supportive of a SGP relaxation or more redistribution. They also want to see 
a credible insolvency procedure in place for euro countries that suffer from a debt 
overhang.
Our cautious prediction is that a one-sided mix of reforms could also cement 
the derogation status of the more advanced CEE countries outside of the euro. A 
reform that, in an unbalanced way, prioritizes fiscal solidarity without improving 
the incentives for a prudent growth and budgetary policy will hardly be met with 
large applause in most parts of the CEE region. Only comprehensive and balanced 
package deals are likely to increase the euro appeal for these countries. Given the 
positioning of national experts in our survey described above, reform packages 
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A viable insolvency procedure for insolvent euro countries could be an important 
safeguard against the likelihood of future bail-outs. Its establishment would signal 
that unsustainable debt levels will not provoke a transfer solution, but will be solved 
through write-offs for private creditors. Under the status quo, crucial elements are 
missing that could make any such debt restructuring a credible option for larger euro 
countries that still appear “too big to fail”.
New stabilization tools that help euro members to cope with transitory negative 
growth and unemployment shocks should be a further appealing element of a compre-
hensive euro reform package given some CEE economies’ experience with high GDP 
and unemployment volatility. Thus, the more negative position on permanent transfers 
and debt bail-outs must be clearly distinguished from a larger support for short-run sta-
bilization tools. Stabilization tools, however, are an important example for the “all or 
nothing” principle of a big bang reform package. Ambitious stabilization tools without a 
credible insolvency procedure run the risk of degenerating into a mechanism for perma-
nent transfers in a new debt crisis. Hence, new stabilization tools should be particularly 
appealing to CEE countries in combination with an insolvency procedure, but much less 
so in isolation. In addition, their design should credibly exclude permanent transfers.
Finally, with calls for more tax centralization there is also one “no go” element in 
the reform package: CEE countries have been using their national tax policy auton-
omy to make their locations more competitive for corporate investment. Tax harmo-
nization that would cut back national autonomy within the EU or within the euro 
area will be seen very critically in the region as this would be perceived as limiting a 
legitimate and important freedom in national economic policy.
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Appendix: Questionnaire
Do you agree with the following statements?
General attitudes on euro and economic policy
Economic benefits of euro
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Having the euro in “MY COUNTRY” as the official currency is economically 
beneficial.
OR




The European Council should be able to vote on tax issues with a qualified major-
ity instead of unanimity (e.g. common caps or floors for corporate taxes binding for 
Member States).
Redistribution
There should be more redistribution from richer to poorer EU Member States.
European Monetary Union (EMU)
European unemployment insurance
The EMU needs fiscal stabilization systems to insure Member States against 
asymmetric shocks (e.g. a common European unemployment insurance).
Eurobonds
All euro countries are jointly liable for Eurobonds and all euro countries pay the 
same interest. The EMU should issue Eurobonds.
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Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
The SGP defines deficit and debt limits for EU Member States. The SGP inappro-
priately constrains fiscal policy in Member States and should be relaxed.
Insolvency procedure for euro Member States
There should be an explicit sovereign insolvency procedure for euro Member 
States with unsustainable debt.
Asset purchase programme of ECB
The European Central Bank (ECB) has taken a strongly active position in recent 
years by purchasing sovereign bonds of euro countries. This strongly active position 
of the ECB should continue.
Completion of Banking Union
For its proper functioning, the European Banking Union should be completed 
through the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).
References
Asatryan Z, Havlik A, Heinemann F, Nover J (2019) Biases in fiscal multiplier estimates. ZEW Discus-
sion Paper 19-25, Mannheim
Backé P, Dvorsky S (2018) Enlargement of the Euro Area toward CESEE: progress and perspectives. 
Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank) 
18(3):43–56
Backé P, Dvorsky S (2019) Enlargement of the Euro Area: taking stock and perspectives. Mimeo, New 
York
Bénassy-Quéré A, Brunnermeier M, Enderlein H, Farhi E, Fratzscher M, Fuest C, Gourinchas P-O, Mar-
tin P, Pisani-Ferry J, Rey H, Schnabel I, Veron N, Weder di Mauro B, Zettelmeyer J (2018) Rec-
onciling risk sharing with market discipline: a constructive approach to Euro Area reform. CEPR 
Policy Insight No 91
Béranger A, Laurence S (2015) Banking union: mind the gaps. Int Econ 144:95–115
Bergsten CF (2012) Why the Euro will survive: completing the continent’s half-built house. Peterson 
Institute for International Economics. https ://piie.com/comme ntary /speec hes-paper s/why-euro-will-
survi ve-compl eting -conti nents -half-built -house . Accessed 22 Aug 2012
Blanchard O (2012) Lessons from Latvia. https ://blogs .imf.org/2012/06/11/lesso ns-from-latvi a/. 
Accessed 11 June 2012
178 Empirica (2021) 48:155–179
1 3
Blesse S, Bordignon M, Boyer PC, Carapella P, Heinemann F, Janeba E, Raj A (2019) United we 
stand?—Survey of French, German and Italian parliamentarians on EU and EMU reforms. ZEW 
policy brief Nr. 19-01, Mannheim
Borsi MT, Metiu N (2015) The evolution of economic convergence in the European Union. Empir Econ 
48(2):657–681
Brunnermeier M, James H, Landau J-P (2016) The Euro and the battle of ideas. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton
Copelovitch M, Frieden J, Walter S (2016) The political economy of the Euro crisis. Comp Political Stud 
49(7):811–840
De Ville F, Berckvens D (2015) What do Eurozone academics think about EMU reform? On broad sup-
port and German exceptionalism. Bruges Political Research Papers 41/2015
Destais C, Eidam F, Heinemann F (2019) The design of a Sovereign debt restructuring mechanism for the 
Euro Area: Choices and trade-offs. EconPol Policy Report 11
Diaz del Hoyo JL, Dorrucci E, Heinz FF, Muzikarova S (2017) Real convergence in the Euro Area: a 
long-term perspective. ECB Occasional Paper 203
Dolls M, Fuest C, Heinemann F, Peichl A (2016) Reconciling insurance with market discipline: a Blue-
print for a European Fiscal Union. CESifo Econ Stud 62(2):210–231
European Commission (2017). EU expenditure and revenue 2014–2020. http://ec.europ a.eu/budge t/graph 
s/reven ue_exped iture .html. Accessed 9 May 2019
European Commission (2018) Eurobarometer 89.1. Brussels, March
European Commission (2019). Convergence criteria for joining. https ://ec.europ a.eu/info/busin ess-econo 
my-euro/euro-area/enlar gemen t-euro-area/conve rgenc e-crite ria-joini ng_en. Accessed 9 May 2019
European Council (2019). Letter of intent. https ://www.consi lium.europ a.eu/media /40282 /lette r-of-inten 
t.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2019
Eurostat (2019a) GDP per capita in PPS (Index (EU28 = 100)). https ://ec.europ a.eu/euros tat/tgm/table 
.do?tab=table &init=1&plugi n=1&langu age=en&pcode =tec00 114. Accessed 9 May 2019
Eurostat (2019b) Real GDP growth rate—volume. https ://ec.europ a.eu/euros tat/tgm/table .do?tab=table 
&init=1&langu age=en&pcode =tec00 115&plugi n=1. Accessed 9 May 2019
Eurostat (2019c) General government expenditure by function: total general government expenditure as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). http://appss o.euros tat.ec.europ a.eu/nui/show.do?datas 
et=gov_10a_exp&lang=en. Accessed 9 May 2019
Eurostat (2019d) General government gross debt—annual data as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP). https ://ec.europ a.eu/euros tat/tgm/table .do?tab=table &init=1&langu age=en&pcode =teina 
225&plugi n=1. Accessed 9 May 2019
Eurostat (2019e) Unemployment by sex and age—annual average: total in percentage of total population. 
https ://ec.europ a.eu/euros tat/de/web/produ cts-datas ets/-/UNE_RT_A. Accessed 9 May 2019
Eurostat (2019f) Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data: net lending (−)/net borrowing 
(+) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). http://appss o.euros tat.ec.europ a.eu/nui/show.
do?datas et=gov_10dd_edpt1 &lang=eng. Accessed 9 May 2019
Financial Post (2019) Bulgaria hopes to join euro zone ‘waiting room’ by end of April. https ://busin ess.
finan cialp ost.com/pmn/busin ess-pmn/bulga ria-hopes -to-join-euro-zone-waiti ng-room-by-end-of-
april -minis ter. Accessed 31 Jan 2020
Fuest C, Heinemann F, Schröder C (2016) A viable insolvency procedure for Sovereigns in the Euro 
Area. J Common Market Stud 54(2):301–317
Hirschman D, Popp Berman E (2014) Do economists make policies? On the political effects of econom-
ics. Socio-Econ Rev 12(4):779–811
Lane PR (2012) The European sovereign debt crisis. J Econ Perspect 26(3):49–68
Lehner T, Wasserfallen F (2019) Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone. Eur Union Politics 
20(1):45–64
OECD (2013) Latest data on the OECD indicators of employment protection. http://www.oecd.org/emplo 
yment /emp/oecdi ndica torso fempl oymen tprot ectio n.htm. Accessed 23 July 2019
Pisany-Ferry J (2018) Euro Area reform: an anatomy of the debate. CEPR Policy Insight No 95
Potrafke N, Reischmann M (2016) How to handle the fiscal crisis in Greece? Empirical evidence based 
on a survey of economic experts. CESifo Working Paper No. 5860
Press and Information Office (2018) Meseberg declaration, renewing Europe’s promises of security and 
prosperity, Berlin. 19.06.2018
Roth F, Jonung L, Nowak-Lehmann F (2016) Crisis and public support for the Euro, 1990–2014. J Com-
mon Market Stud 54:944–960
179
1 3
Empirica (2021) 48:155–179 
Roth F, Baake E, Jonung L, Nowak-Lehmann DF (2019) Revisiting public support for the Euro, 1999–
2017: accounting for the crisis and the recovery. J Common Market Stud 57:1262–1273
Spengel C, Schmidt F, Heckemeyer JH, Nicolay K, Bartholmeß A, Bräutigam R, Braun J, Buchmann P, 
Bührle T, Casi E, Dutt V, Fischer L, Harendt C, Olbert M, Pfeiffer O, Schwab T, Steinbrenner D, 
Stutzenberger K, Todtenhaupt M, Vay H, Werner A (2018) Effective tax levels using the Devereux/
Griffith methodology—update 2017. Project for the EU Commission TAXUD/2013/CC/120 Final 
Report 2017, Mannheim
Von Lyncker K, Thoennessen R (2017) Regional club convergence in the EU: evidence from a panel data 
analysis. Empir Econ 52(2):525–553
Wasserfallen F, Leuffen D, Kudrna Z, Degner H (2019) Analysing European Union decision-making dur-
ing the Eurozone crisis with new data. Eur Union Politics 20(1):3–23
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
